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Abstract

This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then
compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of
multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms from
utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then show that intertemporal price
discrimination is possible, but only when firms adopt inventory controls (sales limit
restrictions) and demand becomes more inelastic over time. Therefore, in addition
to being useful to manage demand uncertainty, inventory controls are also a tool
to soften price competition. We also discuss model extensions, including product
differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons.
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Introduction

In many market settings, firms commit to capacities and then sell their inventories to consumers over time. Classic examples include airline tickets, entertainment or sports events,
hotel bookings, and cruises. In order to allocate capacity over advance-purchase markets,
firms have adopted sophisticated pricing systems. Airlines were early pioneers of revenue management solutions. These systems allow firms to adjust prices in response to
both demand shocks (that affect scarcity) and/or changes in the overall price sensitivity of
consumers over time. Most of the theoretical economics and operations research literature
on revenue management has focused on demand shocks and intertemporal price discrimination in a monopoly setting.1 While these ideas are well understood in the monopoly
setting, it is unclear how they carry over to settings where firms have the incentive to
undercut each others’ ability to price discriminate.
In this paper, we extend the seminal research by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and
Davidson and Deneckere (1986) on sequential quantity-price games to multiple periods.
We show that in the oligopoly setting, strong competitive forces exist that prevent firms
from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination, even in situations where this form of
price discrimination would clearly increase industry profits. We highlight two main contributions. First, we show that advance-purchase prices are flat over time unless firms
make additional commitments. That is, the classic sequential quantity-price games are
robust to breaking up sales into multiple periods because the existence of longer sales
horizons creates a costless arbitrage opportunity in which a firm increases its profits by
shifting sales in lower-priced periods to its rivals in order to increase its market share
in higher-priced periods. Other firms have similar incentives. These strong competitive
forces prevent firms from setting a sequence of increasing prices when demand is more
price inelastic over time. It also prevents firms from setting a sequence of decreasing
1

See Talluri and Van Ryzin 2006 for a survey of both literatures.
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prices when demand becomes more elastic over time. Second, we show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible when firms adopt inventory controls, but only if
demand becomes more inelastic over time. Inventory controls are sales limits assigned
to prices that prevent firms from selling too much capacity at a given price. They are features of firms’ pricing tools in industries with advance purchase sales, including airlines,
hotels, and entertainment or sports events. Therefore, in addition to being a beneficial
tool when aggregate demand is uncertain, we identify another benefit of using inventory
controls—they facilitate price discrimination in oligopoly markets. We discuss extensions
of our baseline model that reflect market characteristics in the aforementioned examples, including product differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales
horizons.
The baseline model in Section 2 considers an oligopoly setting where firms sell a
homogeneous good. Firms first choose capacity—an output constraint that is common
across selling periods—and then compete in prices in a series of sequential markets. In
each period, firms’ remaining capacities are observed, and then firms simultaneously
choose prices and consumers make their purchase decisions. After the final period,
unsold inventory is scrapped with zero value. For tractability reasons, the baseline model
considers two advance-purchase sales periods. We assume that there are a continuum
of consumers, some of whom arrive in each one of two sequential markets. We assume
consumers assigned to the early market can wait and purchase in the later market. We
also allow the elasticity of demand to change over time. We emphasize the case in which
demand becomes more inelastic for two reasons. First, it is clear that a monopolist would
set increasing prices in this case, and second, prices tend to rise in several industries in
which firms compete in sequential quantity-price setting. This is particularly true in the
airline context.
A challenge in solving our game, and the sequential quantity-price games studied
by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1986), is that quantity-
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constrained price games often have mixed-strategy equilibria. Solving our game is considerably more challenging because we consider more than one sales period. We make
our analysis simpler and more intuitive by imposing a relatively mild assumption on
the size of capacity costs that guarantees that capacity choices are small enough so that
equilibria in all of the pricing subgames are pure strategy equilibria both on and off of the
equilibrium path.
We use the model to demonstrate the existence of strong competitive forces that prevent
firms from using intertemporal price discrimination regardless of how the elasticity of
demand changes over time. Equilibria exhibiting intertemporal price discrimination do
not exist because firms have an incentive to use price deviations to shift demand in the
more elastic demand period to rivals, which allows them to capture greater market share
in the more inelastic demand period. Instead, firms charge a uniform price and sell
the Cournot output as if sales all occurred in just one period. When demand becomes
more elastic over time, this competitive effect is compounded by the strategic behavior of
consumers who can choose to wait for prices to decline.
Because firms can costlessly shift their capacity across sequential markets, our result
may not seem surprising. But, recall that if firms could choose how much of their capacity
to allocate to each market, then firms would equate marginal revenues over markets and
not equate prices. We establish that this sequential capacity-then-price game is different
from the Cournot model, even though it coincides with the Cournot model when there is
only one sales period. We characterize sufficient conditions under which uniform prices
arise as the unique pure-strategy equilibrium outcome. Uniform pricing is the equilibrium
outcome whether the elasticity of demand is increasing or decreasing over time. We show
there exist important asymmetries in the sufficient conditions to guarantee uniform pricing
for these two scenarios.
We then enrich the model by allowing firms to implement inventory controls in conjunction with price setting. In this model, firms choose an initial overall capacity limit
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and then simultaneously choose sales-quantity limits and prices in each period. We show
there exist equilibria in which prices are increasing when demand becomes more inelastic
because inventory controls curtail firms’ abilities to shift demand to their competitors in
the early, more elastic period. Here, firms sell at Cournot prices in each period. We show
there do not exist equilibria in which firms can use intertemporal price discrimination
when demand becomes more elastic over time due to forward-looking consumers waiting
for potential price declines.
Our results provide an additional rationale for the use of inventory controls. Although
firms do not articulate price discrimination as an objective, the fact that inventory controls
are widely used in competitive industries with advance-purchase markets and perishable
capacity suggests firms understand their use in softening price competition. Inventory
controls shift capacity to price inelastic customer segments who are then charged higher
prices in later periods. These pricing patterns are observed in airlines and hotels (Puller,
Sengupta, and Wiggins, 2012; Williams, 2020; Cho, Lee, Rust, and Yu, 2018; Siegert and
Ulbricht, 2020). Indeed, management at American Airlines describe inventory controls
as a "strong competitive tool" that determines the "revenue-mix" (who purchases and at
what prices) (Smith, Leimkuhler, and Darrow, 1992).2 Their use in responding to strong
competitive forces has been acknowledged.3
Finally, we discuss model extensions. First, we consider product differentiation. We
argue that prices are no longer uniform across time because firms are unable to shift all
of their sales to rivals using very small price changes. However, the strategic incentives
explored in our baseline model are still present. We use an example to show that products
must be highly differentiated in order for prices to increase substantially over time absent
2
As another example, Hyatt hotels has defined a leadership role of revenue management as to "ensure proper rate positioning and product offering relative to competition."
Source:
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/c/Hyatt-Hotels-Management-Corporation/Job/Director-of-RevenueManagement/-in-New-York,NY?jid=8f8810650023c3bc, accessed 7/2/2021.
3
Smith, Leimkuhler, and Darrow (1992) describe how inventory controls protect the airline from aggressive
competitor pricing, "Yield management has played a key role in allowing American Airlines to compete and
succeed in an environment of stiff price competition. Some of the benefits are difficult to measure, such as
increasing American Airlines’ ability to survive price wars."
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firms using inventory controls.We also show how our results can generalize to many
periods with additional assumptions. Finally, we discuss models with aggregate demand
uncertainty and alternative ways to specify the impact of inventory controls.

1.1

Related Literature

This paper contributes to several strands of literature in economics and management. First,
we contribute to a large literature on price competition with capacity constraints (Levitan
and Shubik, 1972; Allen and Hellwig, 1986; Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; Klemperer and
Meyer, 1986; Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar, 2009). Our work complements Van den
Berg, Bos, Herings, and Peters (2012), who consider a similar model setup but do not allow
firms to shift low-priced sales to rivals.4
Second, we analyze intertemporal price discrimination. Stokey (1979) is a seminal
paper that shows that intertemporal price discrimination is not always feasible in the
monopoly setting. Much of the literature on intertemporal price discrimination finds
that Coasian forces constrain price discrimination (see Öry 2016 and Dilmé and Li 2019),
however, in our setting, competition is the key constraint on price discrimination (see also
Champsaur and Rochet 1989). In our model, consumers know their preferences upon
arrival. Another reason price adjustments can be profitable is that consumers learn their
preferences over time (Akan, Ata, and Dana, 2015; Ata and Dana, 2015).5
Finally, we analyze inventory controls in a different way compared to the existing
literature. Work including Littlewood (1972); Belobaba (1987, 1989); Weatherford and
Bodily (1992); and two overviews, Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006) and McGill and Van Ryzin
(1999), show how inventory controls can be used to manage demand uncertainty. Much of
the work in operations research has been on proposing optimization tools for this setting.
Williams (2020) describes how inventory controls are used by airlines.
4
Also see Benassy (1989) and Reynolds and Wilson (2000) for related pricing games, Aguirre (2017) for a
related quantity games, and De Frutos and Fabra (2011) for a related price and capacity game.
5
Also see Gallego and van Ryzin (1994), Su (2007), Möller and Watanabe (2010), and Board and Skrzypacz
(2016).
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2

The Model

Consider an oligopoly with n firms selling a homogeneous good to a continuum of consumers in a series of advance-purchase sales markets. For tractability, we consider just
two selling periods, or stages, indexed by t = 1, 2. Some consumers arrive in Stage 1
and others arrive in Stage 2. We assume that consumers who arrive earlier can buy in
either Stage 1 or Stage 2, while consumers who arrive later can only purchase in Stage 2.
Consumption takes place afterwards, in Stage 3.
We assume that consumers know their valuations for the good when they arrive. The
valuations of consumers who arrive early do not change if they wait to purchase later.6
Although we do not explicitly consider discounting, all of our results generalize since
we can interpret all prices as prices in the units of Stage 3 dollars. That is, we treat all
payments as if they are made at the time of consumption.
We represent preferences using market demand functions, denoted by D1 (p) and D2 (p),
respectively. We assume these functions are strictly decreasing and twice differentiable.
We let P1 (q) and P2 (q) denote the inverse demands associated with D1 (p) and D2 (p),
0
respectively, and we assume that P00
t (q)q + 2Pt (q) < 0, ∀t = 1, 2. Throughout the paper, we

use pit to denote Firm i’s price; we use pt to denote the vector of all firms’ prices; and we
use pt to denote the Stage t price when all Stage t transactions occur at this price. We use −i
to denote firms other than i. We let Dtot (p) = D1 (p) + D2 (p) denote the total demand when
prices are the same in both stages and Ptot (q) denote the associated inverse total demand
when q units of total output are sold at a uniform price.
The cost per unit of capacity for all firms is c. We make the simplifying assumption
that the marginal cost of production for each unit sold is zero (all the costs of production
are associated capacity, not sales). We let ηt (p) = D0t (p)p/Dt (p) denote the price elasticity of
6

Alternatively, following Dana (1998) and Akan, Ata, and Dana (2015), we could have assumed that some
consumers do not learn their demands until Stage 2 and then make additional mild assumptions that imply
that these consumers would never want to purchase in Stage 1 even if they were able to.
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demand in Stage t.
Each firm’s strategy consist of three choices, capacity and two prices. The game
proceeds in three stages (see Figure 1). First, in Stage 0, firms simultaneously choose
their capacities, denoted by Ki ≥ 0 for firm i or by the vector K. Then, in Stage 1, firms
simultaneously choose prices (p1 ), and consumers who arrive in Stage 1 then make their
purchase decisions. Sales, q1 ≥ 0, are constrained only by the firms’ initial capacities, K1 =
K in Stage 1. Sales in Stage 2 are constrained by firms’ residual capacities, K2 = K − q1 ≥ 0.
That is, the capacity constraint is common across stages. Note that we are making the
natural, but empirically strong, assumption that the firm cannot refuse sales at its Stage 1
price in order to reserve more of its inventory for Stage 2. This is important because of the
strategic uncertainty about rival firms’ prices. We relax this assumption in Section 5 where
we introduce inventory controls. In Stage 2, firms simultaneously choose prices (p2 ), and
consumers who arrive in Stage 2 (or waited) make their purchase decisions. Capacity not
used in Stage 2, K2 − q2 , has zero value (it is scrapped at no cost). We ignore discounting.
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Figure 1: Timing of the Game

2.1

Pure Strategies

This section provides an assumption on capacity costs that enables us to focus only on
games with pure strategy equilibria. If there were just one pricing period (the game
7

ended at the end of Stage 1), then by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)—who analyze efficient
rationing—and Davidson and Deneckere (1986)—who analyze proportional rationing—
we know that the pricing subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium. Both of these papers
characterize the equilibrium profits in the pricing subgame for all capacity choices, including subgames with mixed strategy equilibria.
Quantity-price games, including Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and
Deneckere (1986), are known to have mixed strategy equilibrium off of the equilibrium
path. This makes them difficult to solve. However, both Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and
Davidson and Deneckere (1986) show that when firms choose sufficiently small capacities,
then the pricing subgame has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which all prices equal
the market-clearing price. They also show that for sufficiently high capacity costs, every
pricing subgame in which firms earn positive profits has a pure-strategy equilibrium. Far
from being a special case, the sufficient conditions are just that the cost of capacity is large
enough so that firms never find it profitable to choose so much capacity that the marginal
revenue function is negative. That is, firms collectively choose capacities smaller than the
revenue maximizing capacity.
Because we have multiple pricing periods, characterizing the equilibria of the pricing
subgame is considerably more challenging than in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and
Davidson and Deneckere (1986). To simplify our analysis, we assume that capacity costs
are sufficiently large so that all of the pricing subgames have pure-strategy equilibria.7
We assume that the costs of capacity are high enough to guarantee that firms will never
choose an industry capacity exceeding argmaxq P2 (q)q. We show that even a monopolist
7
In addition to making it easier to derive the equilibrium prices and profits in all of our subgames, another
benefit of assuming that capacity costs are sufficiently high is that we can easily derive identical results for
both the efficient and proportional rationing rules. Recall that in both Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and
Davidson and Deneckere (1986), when firms’ capacities are small—specifically, smaller than the revenue
maximizing capacity, or equivalently smaller than a monopolist’s output if capacity were free—then the price
is always equal to the market-clearing price. This result holds regardless of the rationing rule. The reason
is that marginal revenue is positive in the pricing stage even when firms act as a monopolist. Therefore,
marginal revenue must be positive for every firm. Thus, firms can never increase their profits by setting a
price above the market-clearing price.
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would earn negative profits under these capacity costs. Therefore, firms in the oligopoly
setting would be better off producing zero units.
Formally, we implicitly define Kmax (c) by Πm (Kmax (c), c) = 0, where Πm denotes Stage 0
profits for a monopolist as a function of its capacity choice, or
Πm (K, c) =

max

q1 ,q2 ;q1 +q2 ≤K



P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (q2 )q2 − cK .

(1)

By the implicit function theorem and the generalized envelope theorem,
dKmax (c)
∂Πm (Kmax (c), c)/∂c
Kmax (c)
= − m max
=−
,
dc
c+λ
∂Π (K (c), c)/∂K

(2)

where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint q1 + q2 ≤ K. Therefore, Kmax is a
continuous, decreasing function. It is also true that
lim Kmax (c) > argmax P1 (q1 )q1 + argmax P2 (q2 )q2 ,

(3)

lim Kmax (c) = 0.

(4)

c→0

q1

q2

and
c→∞

Therefore, there exists a unique, strictly positive capacity cost, cL , satisfying
argmax P2 (q)q = Kmax (cL ).

(5)

q

Since the monopolist’s optimal capacity choice must be less than Kmax (cL ) when c ≥ cL , it
follows that if c ≥ cL , then the monopolist sells all of its remaining capacity in Stage 2,
regardless of how much of its capacity it sells in Stage 1.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The cost of capacity satisfies c ≥ cL .
Assumption 1 implies that in every equilibrium, total industry capacity is less than
9

argmaxq P2 (q)q. Otherwise, profits would be negative for at least some firm. Importantly,
Assumption 1 is only a sufficient condition. It may be possible that smaller capacity costs
generate pure strategy equilibria. In addition, our results may hold even when some of
the off-the-equilibrium-path pricing subgames do not have pure strategy equilibria.
In Section 5, we consider a many period model under an alternative assumption to
Assumption 1—that demand is isoelastic. For constant elasticity demand, i.e., p(q) =
q1/ , marginal revenue is strictly positive for all q if || > 1, because p(q) + p0 (q)q = (1 +
1/)q1/ . So for any capacity, a monopolist sets the market-clearing price regardless of
the rationing rule (see Madden 1998). This implies that the Stage 2 price is the market
clearing price. The capacity at which the monopoly profits are zero, Kmax (c), is defined by
[P2 (Kmax (c)) − c] Kmax (c) = 0, so Kmax (c) is continuous and decreasing in c.

2.2

Rationing Rules

Products are homogeneous, so consumers purchase from the lowest-priced firm with
available capacity, as long as their valuations exceeds the price. If firms set different
prices, then a firm with a higher price can have positive sales only if all of the firms with
lower prices have sold all of their capacity.


−i . The
The residual demand facing firm i in stage t can be written as RDt pit ; p−i
,
K
t
t
residual demand function depends on the rationing rule. The efficient rationing rule
specifies that the lowest-priced unit goes to the consumer with the highest willingness to
pay.
The residual demand function under the efficient rationing rule is
X

−i
i
RDt (pit ; p−i
t , Kt ) = Dt (pt ) −
j:

j

Kt , ∀t = 1, 2.

(6)

j
pt <pit

The proportional rationing rule specifies that the lowest-priced unit is equally likely
to be sold to every remaining consumer whose willingness to pay exceeds the price. The
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residual demand function under the proportional rationing rule is


j 

X
Kt 
−i
i 
1 −
 , ∀t = 1, 2.
RDt (pit ; p−i
,
K
)
=
D
(p
)
t

t
t
t 

j 

j:p j <pi Dt (pt )

(7)

Under either rationing rule, if more than one firm charges pit , then the residual demand is
divided equally among firms with remaining capacity.8
We impose the following assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 2. Rationing is either efficient or proportional.

3

A Benchmark Result

Before characterizing the equilibrium of our game, we consider a useful benchmark.
Imagine that firms are constrained to set the same price in Stage 1 and Stage 2—that is,
pi1 = pi2 , ∀i. Then, in equilibrium, K must be the symmetric Cournot output (the Cournot
output when demand is D1 (p) + D2 (p)). This is because Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that
the equilibrium price in the pricing subgame is always equal to the market clearing price,
so the Stage 0 capacity game reduces to a standard Cournot model. We formalize this in
the following lemma. All proofs, except the proof of Lemma 3, are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. When firms are constrained to choose the same price in Stage 1 and Stage 2, if
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the equilibrium price in every Stage 1 and Stage 2 pricing subgame
P
is the market-clearing price defined implicitly by D1 (p)+D2 (p) = i Ki . The equilibrium capacities
chosen in Stage 0 are the Cournot capacities associated with demand Dtot (p) = D1 (p) + D2 (p).
As the number of firms goes to infinity, the price converges to the cost of capacity, c.
Therefore, we refer to c as the competitive price.
8
The rationing rules determine how sales are allocated to different firms within each stage of our game,
but not how sales are allocated across stages. It is plausible to think that efficient rationing is more realistic
when demand becomes more elastic over time, but we do no impose this restriction.
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4

Equilibrium Characterization

We now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the full model, as described in
Section 2, starting with Stage 2 and working backwards to Stage 0.

4.1

The Final Pricing Period

We begin by characterizing equilibrium prices in Stage 2, the final pricing period. Lemma
2 states that in every Stage 2 subgame, firms set prices to clear the market.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, in any subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the threestage game, the price in the second selling period clears the market.
Assumption 1, which implies Lemma 2, is important because it allows us to easily
characterize all of the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the pricing subgame.

4.2

No Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Symmetric Equilibria

We define a uniform-price equilibrium to be an equilibrium in which all transactions occur
at the same price. That is, prices are equal across time, or, if firms’ stated prices decline
over time, then every consumer buys at the same price in the last pricing stage. We say
that an equilibrium is symmetric as long as the transactions prices in each stage are the
same for all firms. We say that the equilibrium is unique if the firms’ transacted prices and
capacities are uniquely defined.
Lemma 3 highlights why competing firms find it difficult to use intertemporal price
discrimination. It highlights the competitive force that equalize prices over time.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the pricing
subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that a subgame perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame exists in which
p1 < p2 . If firm i deviates to a price p̂ > p1 , but arbitrarily close to p1 , in Stage 1, then its
12

sales would be the larger of 0 and RD1 (p̂; p1 , K−i ). If the residual demand is zero then Stage
1 sales are unchanged, equal to D1 (p1 ), and the Stage 2 market clearing price is unchanged
by Lemma 2. This implies that firm i’s profits are strictly higher, which is a contradiction.
P
j
If the residual demand is positive, then RD1 (p̂; p1 , K−i
1 ) + j,i K1 is arbitrarily close to D(p1 )
for both rationing rules because p̂ is arbitrarily close to p1 , so the market clearing price
in Stage 2 is arbitrarily close to p2 . This implies that firm i’s profits are strictly higher
following its deviation, which is a contradiction.
Suppose that a subgame perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame exists in which
p1 > p2 . In this case, since consumers can choose to wait, there are no transactions in Stage
1, and all transactions take place in Stage 2 at a price p2 . This implies that all transactions
prices are the same. That is, there must also exist a payoff-equivalent equilibrium in which
the Stage 2 prices are unchanged, but pi1 = p2 for all i.9 
Lemma 3 demonstrates the strong competitive forces in the model. If prices changed
over time (in a symmetric equilibrium), individual firms could change their prices in
order to increase their sales in the higher-priced period. Prices cannot rise over time
because firms can raise their Stage 1 price to shift sales to rivals in Stage 1 and thereby
sell more in Stage 2. Similarly, prices cannot fall over time for the same reason. However,
recall that even a monopolist cannot benefit from declining prices because we assumed
that consumers can wait until prices are lower to make their purchases, so there are two
reasons prices cannot decline.
While symmetric equilibria must have uniform prices, asymmetric equilibria may
also exist, but below we characterize reasonable conditions under which only symmetric
equilibria exist. Finally, note that if we include discounting, then prices are uniform when
expressed in Stage 3 dollars. That is, empirically we would expect to see very small price
9

Note that even if consumers could not wait, which we think is unrealistic, any firm with strictly positive
sales in Stage 2 could deviate to a price p̂ < p1 that is arbitrarily close to p1 . Total Stage 1 sales would be
arbitrarily close to D(p1 ) under either rationing rule because p̂ is arbitrarily close to p1 . Then the market
clearing price in Stage 2 is arbitrarily close to p2 , which implies the deviation is profitable. So, the proof does
not depend on our assumption that consumers can wait.
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increases over time since consumers and firms need to be indifferent between Stage 1 and
Stage 2 transactions.

4.3

Decreasing Elasticity of Demand

4.3.1

The Pricing Subgame

In Proposition 1, below, we show that there are two types of pure-strategy subgame perfect
equilibria in the pricing subgame when demand becomes more inelastic over time. Since
the market clears in Stage 2 by Lemma 2, any uniform-price equilibrium must satisfy
P
D1 (p∗ ) + D2 (p∗ ) = i Ki . The uniform price is unique by Lemma 1, though consumption
can take place in both periods or just in Stage 2.
In an asymmetric-price equilibrium, a single firm sells in Stage 1. The Stage 1 price is
lower than the Stage 2 price, and all other firms sell only in Stage 2. Intuitively, the firm
that sells in Stage 1 is pushing up the price in Stage 2 by limiting Stage 2 capacity. So in a
sense the firm is providing a public good. It follows that only one firm sets a low Stage 1
price and the others free ride.
Let Firm i be the firm that sells in the Stage 1, and let pi1 and qi1 denote its first-period
price and quantity, where



 
X
pi1 = argmax pD1 (p) + P2 
Ki − D1 (p) Ki − D1 (p) ,
i
p∈[P1 (K ),∞]

(8)

i

or, equivalently,
qi1




X
 
i

= argmax P1 (q)q + P2 
K − q Ki − q .
i
q∈[0,K ]

(9)

i

Firm i’s first-period sales do not exceed Ki , and the second-period price is higher than pi1
and is given by



X
P2 
Ki − D1 (pi1 ) .
i

14

(10)

Note that Proposition 1 holds regardless of whether or not the elasticity is decreasing.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the pricing subgame is either a uniform-price equilibrium or an asymmetric-price equilibrium
satisfying Equations (8), (9) and (10). When a uniform-price equilibrium exists, it is the unique
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. When a uniform-price equilibrium does not exist, then
at least one, and at most n, asymmetric-price equilibria exist.
Intuitively, asymmetric-price equilibria exist because a lower price in Stage 1 increases
sales in Stage 1, leading to less output sold and a higher price in Stage 2. A firm can
increase its profit in this way only if the elasticity is decreasing (so increasing prices is
desirable) and only if it has sufficient capacity to meet all of the demand in Stage 1 plus
enough additional capacity to profit from selling at the higher price in Stage 2. Other firms
free ride and sell only in Stage 2 at the higher price.
Asymmetric-price equilibria are more likely to exist than uniform-price equilibria when
one firm chooses significantly more capacity than its rivals in Stage 0. The incentive to
deviate to a lower price is increasing in the deviating firm’s capacity, decreasing in the rival
firms’ capacities, increasing in the relative elasticity of Stage 1 demand, and decreasing in
the relative magnitude of Stage 1 demand.
Like Lemma 2, Proposition 1 highlights the pressure on competing firms to equalize
prices across periods. Unless one firm is sufficiently large and can unilaterally implement
an asymmetric-price equilibrium, the equilibrium is a uniform-price equilibrium. Although Proposition 1 shows that asymmetric-price equilibria of the pricing subgame may
exist, we now show that under relatively mild additional assumptions, the uniform-price
equilibrium is unique even when the elasticity of demand is decreasing.
Assumption 3, stated below, is a sufficient condition to guarantee that asymmetricprice equilibria do not exist. Assumption 3 requires that demand in Stage 2 is not too
inelastic relative to demand in Stage 1. While demand in the Stage 2 is less elastic than
demand in Stage 1, Assumption 3 limits how inelastic demand in Stage 2 can be. This
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relatively weak assumption implies that no firm has enough capacity to profitably deviate
from the symmetric uniform-price equilibrium.
Assumption 3. The elasticities of demand and capacities satisfy
η2 (p)
Ki
> Pn
, ∀p > 0, i = 1, ..., n.
j
η1 (p)
j=1 K

(11)

Proposition 2. If demand becomes more inleastic over time, then under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3,
the unique subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium of the Stage 1 and Stage 2 pricing subgame
is a uniform-price equilibrium.
With the addition of Assumption 3, we obtain Proposition 2 which states that the unique
equilibrium of the pricing subgames is a uniform-price equilibrium. Intuitively, when the
elasticity is decreasing, deviating from a uniform price is profitable for a monopolist if it
raises the Stage 2 profit by more than it lowers the Stage 1 profit. However, since rivals
free ride and sell only in Stage 2, an oligopoly firm that deviates to a lower Stage 1 price
earns at most 1/nth of the Stage 2 industry profits. The oligopoly firm that deviates cannot
increase its profit unless it can increase the Stage 2 industry profits by at least n times the
decrease in its Stage 1 profit. For such a deviation to be profitable, the Stage 1 demand
must be at least n times more elastic than the Stage 2 demand. Assumption 3 guarantees
that such a deviation is not profitable.
Proposition 2 is important because it shows that oligopoly firms are unable to price
discriminate even when a monopolist would clearly choose discriminatory prices.
4.3.2

Initial Capacity Choice

We now consider the full game, which includes Stage 0. This means we can relax Assumption 3 since we no longer need to prove our result for all capacities but only for the
capacities chosen in equilibrium. We replace Assumption 3 with Assumption 4 below.
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Assumption 4. The elasticity of demand satisfies
η2 (p) 1
> , ∀p > 0.
η1 (p) n
Proposition 3. If demand becomes more inleastic over time, then under Assumptions 1, 2 and
4, the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game is a uniform-price
equilibrium. The equilibrium capacity and profits are equal to the Cournot capacity and profits
given demand D1 (p) + D2 (p).
Proposition 3 shows that intertemporal price discrimination is impossible in oligopoly
markets when demand becomes more inelastic over time.

4.4

Increasing Elasticity of Demand

We now establish results under the case in which demand becomes more elastic over time.
In this case, consumers have an incentive to wait to purchase. These Coasian forces can
prevent even a monopolist from using intertemporal price discrimination.
Proposition 4 establishes that prices are always uniform in the pricing subgame when
demand becomes more elastic over time.
Proposition 4. When demand is constant or becomes more elastic over time, then under Assumptions 1 and 2, the uniform-price equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the pricing subgame.
This result holds for two reasons. First, the same competitive forces that constrain
firms when the elasticity of demand is increasing constrain firms when the elasticity of
demand is decreasing. That is, firms want to shift lower priced sales onto their rivals.
Second, price discrimination is also constrained by the fact that consumers can wait and
purchase in Stage 2 if prices decline over time.
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4.4.1

Initial Capacity Choice

We now consider the full game, including the initial capacity choice.
Proposition 5. When demand is constant or becomes more elastic over time, then under Assumptions 1 and 2, the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game is a
uniform-price equilibrium. Equilibrium capacity and profits are equal to the Cournot capacity and
profits given demand D1 (p) + D2 (p).
Proposition 5 follows immediately from previous results. When demand becomes
more elastic over time, Assumption 4 is always satisfied, so the Cournot model is even
more robust to breaking up demand into multiple pricing periods. However, this is largely
because consumers have the option to wait.10

5

Inventory Controls

In the previous section, we showed that firms choose capacity equal to the Cournot output
and set the same price in both pricing periods. They set the one-shot Cournot price and
quantity, even when profits would be higher with intertemporal price discrimination.
We now show that inventory controls allow firms to price discriminate and earn higher
profits, but only if demand becomes more inelastic over time. We model inventory controls
as an upper bound on the quantity sold each pricing period, and we allow firms to set
inventory controls when they set their price. So firms first choose their initial capacity, and
then, in each of the subsequent pricing periods, simultaneously choose both their price
and an inventory control. For two pricing periods the timing is shown in Figure 2.
Inventory controls allow a firm to ensure that if a rival deviates to a higher price in
Stage 1, then its own sales will not increase. Inventory controls place a cap on sales and
not a floor. Hence, inventory controls highlight another natural asymmetry that arises
10
In an earlier version of the paper, we assumed that consumers did not have the option to wait and showed
that a uniform-price equilibrium may not always exist under increasing elasticity of demand.
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Figure 2: Timing of the Game with Inventory Controls
between increasing and decreasing elasticity of demand: Inventory controls can prevent a
rival from increasing a firm’s sales by deviating to a higher price, but they cannot prevent
a rival from lowering a firm’s sales by deviating to a lower price.
Proposition 6. If demand becomes more inelastic over time, then under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the model with inventory controls exists in which all firms set
the Cournot price and set inventory controls equal to the Cournot quantity in each selling period.
Profits are strictly higher in this equilibrium than in the uniform-price equilibrium.
In the equilibrium described in Proposition 6, firms commit to inventory controls that
are equal to each firm’s equilibrium sales in each stage. Inventory controls do not restrict
output on the equilibrium path, but they do act as a strategic commitment device because
they constrain the firm’s off-the-equilibrium-path output. In equilibrium, firms sell the
Cournot output associated with each stage, and so prices rise over time because demand
becomes more inelastic. This is contrast to the model without inventory controls in which
firms prices are constant and firms sell the Cournot quantity associated with the aggregate
demand, D1 (p) + D2 (p).
The model with inventory controls does have other equilibria. In particular, the
symmetric capacity, uniform-price equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 may still be
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a subgame perfect equilibrium of the inventory control game. There are many different
increasing price paths that can be supported with inventory controls. We think that it is
natural for firms to coordinate on the Cournot quantities. In the appendix, we provide
an example demand system and show the change in profits by firms adopting inventory
controls.

6

Extensions

6.1

Product Differentiation

Introducing product differentiation does not alter the firms’ incentives to attempt to shift
demand to their competitors in Stage 1 when demand becomes more inelastic over time.
However, product differentiation does make shifting demand more costly. When products are homogeneous, a small price increase shifts every consumer to the rivals. With
differentiated products, any price increase will shift fewer consumers to the rivals, and
the profit increase in Stage 2 will be smaller.
Product differentiation also introduces increased complexity, so to illustrate its impact
we focus our attention on two firms in a symmetric environment. We provide intuition
instead of analyzing the equilibrium of the model. We maintain the assumption that
capacity is sufficiently small so that firms always set market-clearing prices in Stage 2.
Product differentiation results in equilibrium subgame prices that are no longer uniform over time; however, prices are flatter for any amount of product differentiation than
the joint-profit-maximizing prices (see Figure 3 for an example, where the left plot shows
increasing differences in prices across periods as product differentiation increases). To see


A , qB ,
this, consider two firms, A and B, and let the inverse demand functions be PA
q
1
1 1






A
B
B
A
B
A
A
B
B
P1 q1 , q1 , P2 q2 , q2 , and P2 q2 , q2 . Joint-profit-maximizing firms would set marginal
revenue
equal to the shadow cost of capacity in each of the four product markets, so


j j −j
 j −j 
∂Pi qt ,qt
j
j
q
+
P
= λ, ∀t = 1, 2; j = A, B. Suppose that the joint-profit-maximizing
j
t
t qt , qt
∂qt
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Figure 3: Intertemporal Price Discrimination as a Function of Product Differentiation
(a) Prices Across Periods

(b) Competition vs. Joint-Profit Maximization

Notes: Example constructed using a random utility model (logit) with two firms and two periods. Product differentiation
is increasing towards the right of the plots. (a) The light dashed line corresponds to the own-price elasticity for a constant
price offered by both firms. As products become increasingly differentiated, the difference between p1 and p2 increases. (b)
Shows the change in price (p2 − p1 ) of competition model versus the joint-profit maximization model. Prices are flatter in
the competition model, as the gap between the two models grows with the degree of differentiation.

prices are increasing over time.
Contrast these prices with the prices that would be set by two competing firms given
the same initial capacity. If Firm A sets a higher price than the joint-profit-maximizing
firm, it will sell less in Stage 1 and, hence, more in Stage 2. Sales for Firm B are higher
in Stage 1, and it has less to sell in Stage 2; thus, in Stage 2, its price is higher and Firm
A’s demand is higher. Because it ignores the loss for Firm B, Firm A has an incentive to
set a higher first-period price than the joint-profit-maximizing monopolist. Firm B has a
similar incentive. In equilibrium, both firms’ prices will be flatter relative to joint-profitmaximizing prices (see the right panel in Figure 3). It is also worth noting that prices
might still be perfectly flat if sufficiently many consumers were indifferent between the
firms—a symmetric increasing price equilibrium does not exist because either firm could
strictly increase profits with an arbitrarily small price increase.
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6.2

Many Periods

An obvious limitation of the paper is that we consider only two pricing periods. Extending
the model without inventory controls to more than two periods is difficult because stronger
assumptions are required in order to ensure firms play pure strategies on and off the
equilibrium path. In addition, it is difficult to find sufficient conditions that rule out
asymmetric equilibria. However, we use an example to show that Proposition 6 can be
generalized to many periods.
Instead of strengthening Assumption 1, we assume isoelastic demand, i.e., p(q) =
q1/ , because, with isoelastic demand, even the monopolist’s marginal revenue is always
positive for isoelastic demand. That is, p(q) + p0 (q)q = (1 + 1/)q1/ > 0, if  > 1. In any
equilibrium, firms must sell all of their capacity. Consider any vector of capacities K.
And consider a sequence of isoelastic demands satisfying |t | strictly increasing in t, for
t = 1, . . . , T, if the game has only one pricing period – the last period – so demand is
p(q) = q1/T , then clearly the firms set the marketing clearing price for all K.
Now proceed by induction.11 Suppose that for all K. there exists an equilibrium of
the s-period pricing game (the final s periods) in which firms sell all of their capacity and
equalize their marginal revenue across periods. This clearly holds for s = 1. We now show
that it follows that for all K there exists an equilibrium of the s + 1-period pricing game
in which firms sell all of their capacity and set prices and inventory controls that equalize
their marginal revenue across periods.
First, there clearly exists a unique vector of inventory controls for period 1 that equalizes
marginal revenue between period 1 and the remaining s periods for all firms. That is,
letting kti denote firm i’s inventory control and sales in period t, the inventory controls are
P j
P j
P j
P j
uniquely defined by kti p0 ( j kt ) + p( j kt ) = kτi p0 ( j kτ ) + p( j kτ ), ∀t, τ, i.
Second, if each firm chooses these inventory controls and sets the market clearing
11

As in the two period model, total demand grows as each period is added in the inductive proof, but we
could also have held total demand fixed and divided demand into more discrete periods.
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price in period 1 then no deviation is profitable. No deviation in the inventory control is
profitable. In addition, no price decrease is profitable because the firm would sell more
at the low price in period 1 and sell less in every period that has a higher price; so what
remains is to show that no price increase is profitable. We consider both rationing rules.
Under the proportional rationing rule, the residual demand on the inverse demand
 i
j
P
k
q
curve is p1 Z where Z = 1 − j,i 1 j . At equal prices, firm i’s marginal revenue on
D1 (p1 )

this demand curve is clearly the same as firm i’s marginal revenue p1 (q), so deviating to a
higher price implies that the period 1 marginal revenue is higher than marginal revenue
in every other period, so profits are lower. No deviation to a higher price is profitable
under proportional rationing.
Under the efficient rationing rule, the residual demand on the inverse demand curve is

P
j
p1 qi + j,i k1 . At equal prices, firm i’s marginal revenue on this demand curve is strictly


higher than on p1 (q), so deviating to a higher price implies that the period 1 marginal
revenue is higher than the marginal revenue in every other period, so profits are lower.
No deviation to a higher price is profitable under efficient rationing.

6.3

Aggregate Demand Uncertainty

Inventory controls are generally described as a tool for managing demand uncertainty, so
it is useful to describe how the model could be extended to include such uncertainty. To
generate intuition, we briefly describe a potential extension in which aggregate demand
is uncertain only in Stage 1. That is, firms set the Stage 1 prices before learning the Stage
1 demand, and then firms set prices in Stage 2 that clear the market. This sort of (slow)
updating has been documented in the airline industry (Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg,
and Williams, 2021).
Suppose that consumers in Stage 1 can be either high or low, and consumers in Stage 1
are known to have more elastic demand than consumers in Stage 2. A monopolist choosing
prices and capacity optimally would like to set a lower price in Stage 1 than in Stage 2,
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but would also like to limit sales in Stage 1 to reserve sufficient capacity for Stage 2 in the
event that demand is high. This is why inventory controls are useful for a monopolist.
But clearly the monopoly prices are not an equilibrium with competing firms, even if
the firms have the same capacity as the monopolist, because the monopoly prices increase
over time and competing firms prefer to sell more of their capacity in Stage 2, when the
expected price is higher. Any firm can shift a discrete amount of its Stage 1 sales to its
rival through an arbitrarily small price increase in its Stage 1 price. So the expected price
in Stage 2 must be equal to the price charged in Stage 1 in any symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium.
In this stylized setting, a monopolist benefits from inventory controls because aggregate
demand is uncertain. In the oligopoly setting, firms benefit from inventory controls
because they facilitate intertemporal price discrimination and because aggregate demand
is uncertain.

6.4

Alternative Timing of Inventory Controls

When considering firms’ inventory control decisions, we could also have allowed firms to
commit to observable inventory controls before setting their price. In this case inventory
controls serve two functions. First, they prevent rival firms from raising their price in order
to increase the firm’s sales when the price is low. And second, they place an observable
limit on the firm’s own sales which reduces the firm’s return from price cutting. While this
means that the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is undoubtedly different, Proposition
5 still holds. If each firm sets an inventory control equal to the Cournot output, then firms
would clearly set Cournot prices, and no unilateral inventory control deviation could
increase profits.
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7

Conclusion

We establish that inventory controls can facilitate intertemporal price discrimination in an
oligopoly. When a single firm serves the market, and demand becomes more inelastic over
time, then the firm can clearly charge higher prices to late-arriving consumers. However,
in our oligopoly model, strong competitive forces arise that prevent increasing prices over
time. Individually, firms have an incentive to move their capacity to the period with a
highest price. Consequently, firms will compete until prices are equalized over time, even
though each firm has market power, and firms would collectively earn higher profits if
prices were increasing.
In order to coordinate on increasing prices when late-arriving consumers have higher
willingness to pay, firms must shield themselves from these strong competitive forces. We
show that firms will commit to capping their sales each period (using inventory controls),
in order for prices to rise over time. While extensive research in economics and operations
research focuses on inventory controls as a tool to manage uncertain demand, here, we
show that inventory controls are also a tool to facilitate intertemporal price discrimination.
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A

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Suppose not, then so some firm with positive capacity is charging a price not equal
to the market-clearing price. Clearly, trade must take place at that price since otherwise
profits are negative.
Suppose that some firm sets a price strictly below the market-clearing price with strictly
positive probability. Let pL be the lowest such price. Clearly, a firm setting a price equal to
pL sells all of its capacity since pL is below the market-clearing price. Then, D1 (pL ) + D2 (pL )
exceeds the combined capacity of every firm because pL is below the market clearing
P
price, and the market-clearing price is defined by D1 (p) + D2 (p) = i Ki , and both demand
functions are strictly decrease in p. Therefore, D1 (pL ) + D2 (pL ) exceeds the capacity of the
firm or firms setting a price equal to pL . But, this implies that there exists a price strictly
higher than pL at which a firm setting a price equal to pL would also sell all of its capacity,
which is a contradiction. So all firms are charging a price greater than or equal to the
market clearing price.
Now suppose that some firm sets a price strictly greater than the market-clearing price
with strictly positive probability. Let pH be the highest such price. Because industry
capacity is equal to demand at the market-clearing price, and all firms are charging a price
greater than or equal to the market-clearing price, it follows that at least one firm charging
pH does not sell all of its capacity. If two or more firms set a price equal to pH with strictly
positive probability, then a firm that does not sell all of its capacity can strictly increase
profits by decreasing its price to pH − , which is a contradiction.
If only one firm charges pH with strictly positive probability, and that firm has positive
sales in Stage 1, then that firm’s revenue (all costs are sunk) is equal to pH RD1 (pH ; p−i , K−i )+
pH D2 (pH ) and all of the other firms’ sales are in Stage 1 only. Alternatively, if only one firm
sets a price pH with strictly positive probability and its sales are zero in Stage 1, then its
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revenue is equal to pH RD2 (pH ; p−i , K−i
), where K−i
is the other firms’ remaining capacity
2
2
at the start of Stage 2.
Clearly the firm charging pH will not sell all of its capacity in either case, because pH
exceeds the market-clearing price, and the other firms are all setting prices at or above the
market-clearing price, so total consumption must be less than available capacity.
Assume that the firm’s rivals are playing pure strategies. Under the efficient rationing
rule, if the firm has positive sales in Stage 1, then the derivative of its revenue with respect
to its price is RD1 (pH ; p−i , K−i ) + pH D01 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) + pH D02 (pH ), which is negative because
1) RD1 (p; p−i , K−i ) < D1 (p), ∀p; 2) pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (pH ) < 0; and 3) pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0.
The second and third statements are true because, by Assumption 1, D1 (pH )+D2 (pH ) is less
than the revenue-maximizing output (marginal revenue is positive). So, lowering price
below pH increases profit, which is a contradiction. Under the efficient rationing rule, if
the firm charging pH has zero sales in Stage 1, then the derivative of profit with respect
to price is D2 (pH ) + pH D02 (pH ), which is negative because, by Assumption 1, D2 (pH ) is less
than the revenue-maximizing output (marginal revenue is positive). So, lowering price
below pH increases profit, which is a contradiction.
Under the proportional rationing rule, if the firm charging pH has positive sales in
Stage 1, then the derivative of profit with respect to Firm i’s price is
RD1 (p; p−i , K−i ) + pH RD01 (pH ; p−i , K−i ) + pH D2 (pH ) + D02 (pH ) =


X K j  

 


0
pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (ph ) 1 −
+
p
D
(p
)
+
D
(p
)

H 2 H
2 H , (12)

D2 (p j ) 
j,i

which is negative because pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (pH ) < 0, and pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. These are
both true because, by Assumption 1, D1 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) is less than the revenue-maximizing
output. So lowering price below pH increases profit, which is a contradiction. Under
the proportional rationing rule, if the firm charging pH has zero sales in Stage 1, then the
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derivative of profit with respect to Firm i’s price is
0
−i
−i
RD2 (p; p−i , K−i
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which is negative because pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (pH ) < 0 and pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. This is true
because D1 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) is less than the revenue-maximizing output. So lowering price
below pH increases profit, which is a contradiction.
Under either rationing rule, if rivals are playing mixed strategies then the firm’s expected profit is a weighted average of the above pure-strategy profit functions, all of which
are strictly decreasing at the price pH , so we have a contradiction. 

Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. Suppose not. First, suppose that some firm is charging a price strictly below the
market-clearing price with positive probability. Let pL be the lowest such price. Clearly
any firm charging pL sells all of its capacity (because pL is below the market clearing price),
but then there must exist a strictly higher price at which the same firm sells all of its
capacity and earns strictly higher profits, which is a contradiction.
Now suppose instead that some firm charges a price strictly above the market-clearing
price with positive probability. Let pH be the highest such price offered. Clearly at least
one firm offering to sell at price pH does not sell all of its capacity, because pH is above the
market clearing price. If two or more firms charge pH with strictly positive probability,
then at least one of the firms does not sell all of its capacity, and that firm can strictly
increase its sales and profits by decreasing its price to pH − , which is a contradiction.
If only one firm is charging the price pH with strictly positive probability, and if other
firms are playing pure strategies, then a firm charging pH earns revenues (or continuation
profits) equal to pH RD2 (pH ; p−i , q−i ), where p−i and q−i are the other firms’ prices and
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remaining capacities.
Under the efficient rationing rule, the derivative of profit with respect to the continuation price is RD2 (p; p−i , q−i ) + pD02 (p), which is stictly negative at p = pH because
RD2 (pH ; p−i , q−i ) < D2 (pH ) and pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. The latter is true because D2 (pH )
is less than the remaining industry capacity (pH is above the market clearing price) and
the initial industry capacity, so, by Assumption 1, D2 (pH ) is also less than the revenuemaximizing output. So, lowering price below pH strictly increases profit, which is a
contradiction.
Under the proportional rationing rule, the derivative of profit with respect to Firm



P
qj
0
−i
−i
0
−i
−i
i’s price is RD2 (p; p , q ) + pRD2 (p; p , q ) = pD2 (p) + D2 (p) 1 − j,i D (p j ) , which is
2

strictly negative at p = pH because

pH D02 (pH )

+ D2 (pH ) < 0. This is true because D2 (pH ) is

less than the remaining industry capacity (pH is above the market clearing price) and the
initial industry capacity, so, by Assumption 1, D2 (pH ) is less than the revenue-maximizing
output. Lowering price below pH strictly increases profit, which is a contradiction.
Finally, since a deviation is profitable regardless of what prices the rivals charge, it
follows that a deviation is profitable even when rivals’ pricing strategies are mixed. 

Proof of Proposition 1:
Let pL = mini pi1 denote the lowest equilibrium price offered in Stage 1. Recall that by
Lemma 2 and under Assumption 1, all firms with positive remaining capacity in the Stage
2 charge the market-clearing price. The proof of the proposition proceeds as a series of six
claims.
1) In any pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing subgame that has positive sales in both stages,
pL ≤ p2 .
If a pure strategy equilibrium exists in which pL > p2 , then all consumers who arrive
in Stage 1 must be waiting to purchase until Stage 2. So, sales are zero at pL , which is a
contradiction.
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2) In any pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing subgame, if pL is offered by two or more firms in
Stage 1, and if sales at pL are strictly positive, then pL = p2 .
Suppose not. Then it follows that pL < p2 , by Claim 1 above. Since pL is offered by two
or more firms, let Firm i be one of these firms. Then Firm i’s continuation profit can be
n
o




P
written as pL xi + P2 Ki − xi , where xi = min RD1 pL ; pL , j,i|p j =pL K j , Ki is Firm i’s sales
at pL .
If Firm i deviates to a slightly higher price pL + , its profit is
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where P̂2 (·) is the market clearing price in period 2, which is a continuous and decreasing
function of the total capacity remaining after Stage 1.
If xi = Ki , then Firm i’s profit is clearly higher since pL +  > pL and P̂2 (·) > pL , so all of
Firm i’s sales are at a higher price and its sales volume does not change.
P
If, on the other hand, xi < Ki and RD1 (pL ; pL , j,i|p j =pL K j ) < Ki , then the same deviation
is still profitable for Firm i because
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since RD is decreasing in price (for either rationing rule), and so the limit of (14) as  goes
to 0 is
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Profits are higher because the firm sells more units at p2 and fewer units at pL and p2 > pL .
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A deviation is profitable, which is a contradiction.
3) If pL = p2 , then the equilibrium is a uniform-price equilibrium.
Suppose not, so some Firm j sets a price p j > pL = p2 in Stage 1. Because consumers
can wait, it follows that Firm j’s sales are zero, so the equilibrium is a uniform-price
equilibrium.
4) There exists at most one uniform-price equilibrium of the pricing subgame (the total sales and
the transaction price is unique).
Given capacities, the price and volume of sales in a uniform-price equilibrium are
P
uniquely defined because only one price satisfies D1 (p) + D2 (p) = i Ki .
5) Any pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium is either a uniform-price equilibrium or an
asymmetric price equilibrium. Either a uniform-price equilibrium exists or one or more asymmetric
price equilibria exists, but not both.
As above, consider the unique candidate uniform-price equilibrium. Suppose this
equilibrium does not exist. Then it must be that deviating in Stage 1 is profitable. But
deviating to a higher price in Stage 1 is never profitable. Consumers prefer to wait and buy
at the market clearing price in Stage 2. So deviating to a lower price must be profitable.
If deviating from the uniform-price to a lower price in Stage 1 is profitable for some
firm, then it is clearly also profitable for the firm that has the largest capacity. Let i denote
the firm with the largest capacity; let pi1 denote the firm’s profit-maximizing deviation in
Stage 1; and let p̂2 denote the resulting second-period market-clearing price.
Then it follows that pi1 and p̂2 must define an asymmetric-price equilibrium. Firm i
sells in both periods (otherwise the deviation isn’t profitable) so all other firms must sell
only in Stage 2. Clearly Firm i has no incentive to deviate since by construction pi1 is its
best response to the other firms’ strategies. And if any other firm could increase its profits
by charging a price less than pi1 , then it follows that Firm i could also increase its profit
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by deviating to that same price (because Firm i has more capacity), in which case pi1 is not
Firm i’s profit-maximizing price, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, if an asymmetric price equilibrium exists, then pi1 must be the best response
for Firm i to other firms’ prices, even if they were all charging p2 in Stage 1. So a uniformprice equilibrium does not exist.
6) There exist at most n asymmetric-price equilibria.
We show that there exists, at most, one asymmetric-price equilibrium in which Firm i
is the low-priced firm in period one (or, more strictly speaking, such equilibria differ only
in the prices of firms with zero sales).
In an asymmetric-price equilibrium, if Firm i is the low-price firm, then it is the only
firm with positive sales in Stage 1. Let p denote Firm i’s equilibrium price. As in Claim 5 let
pi1 denote Firm i’s best response when rival firm’s are charging the unique uniform-price
equilibrium price, which is the same as its optimal price when rivals are setting the market
clearing price in Stage 2.
However, if p > pi1 , then Firm i can profitably deviate to pi1 because regardless of what
price it sets, its rivals are selling at the market clearing price in Stage 2. And, if p < pi1 ,
then because π(p) is concave and maximized at pi1 , it follows that Firm i is strictly better off
increasing its price. So, p cannot be an asymmetric-price equilibrium price unless p = pi1 .
Therefore, the only one asymmetric-price equilibrium that can exist in which Firm i is
the low-price firm in the first period and that equilibrium is given by (8) and (10). Since
there are n firms there are at most n asymmetric-price equilibria.

Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Let Ki denote each firm’s capacity, and let p̃ denote the unique uniform price defined
P
by Dtot (p̃) = D1 (p̃) + D2 (p̃) = i Ki . By Assumption 1 and Proposition 1, the uniform-price
equilibrium is unique if it exists, or no deviation is profitable.
Suppose that D1 (p̃) ≥ maxi Ki . Then a deviation to a lower price is not profitable,
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because any firm that cuts its price in Stage 1 will sell all of its capacity at the lower
deviation price and hence earn strictly lower profits.
Now suppose that D1 (p̃) < maxi Ki . Then for any Firm i such that Ki ≤ D1 (p̃), a
deviation to a lower price is not profitable by the same argument. When Ki > D1 (p̃), then a
deviation to a lower price could increase the market-clearing price in period 2, and could
increase the firm’s profits, but only if demand is becoming less elastic over time so the
firms jointly prefer to set prices that increase over time.
Let Firm i be the deviating firm, and let p2 (·) denote the second-period market-clearing
price as a function of remaining capacity. Firm i’s problem is to choose a price pi < p̃, or
equivalently, a quantity qi = D1 (pi ) to maximize its continuation profit,

 n

 
X
Ki − qi  Ki − qi ,
π̂i (qi ; p̃, K) = qi p1 (qi ) + P2 

(15)

i=1


i
subject to qi ∈ D1 (p̃), Ki – higher output levels are not feasible, and lower output levels
are inconsistent with a lower first period price. The first-order condition is

 n

 n

X

X
dπ̂(qi ; p̃, K)
Ki − qi  (Ki − qi ) = 0,
Ki − qi  − P02 
= P1 (qi ) + qi P01 (qi ) − P2 
dq

(16)
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i=1

or
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dπ̂(qi ; p̃, K)
1
i
= P1 (q ) 1 +
dq
η1 (P1 (qi ))
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i
K
K −q
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K i − qi

Clearly, the objective function, equation (15), is concave, so (17) implies that a deviation to a lower price is profitable if and only if limq↓D1 (p̃)
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dπ̂(q;p̃,K)
dq

> 0, or equivalently,

limp↑p̃

dπ̂(D1 (p);p̃,K)
dq

> 0. But clearly
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1
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deviation to a lower price is not profitable if
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(18)

or equivalently, if Assumption 3 holds.
Finally, consider a deviation to a higher price. If D1 (p̃) <

P

j,i K

j,

for all i, then no

such deviation can have any effect on first or second period sales. The firms that do not
P
deviate can meet all of the demand at the price p̃. If, on the other hand, D1 (p̃) > j,i K j , for
some i, then a firm can deviate to a higher price and have positive sales. However even
a monopolist would not find such a deviation profitable when demand is becoming less
elastic over time, so no firm will deviate to a higher price. 

Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, if a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which every
firm chooses K∗ units of capacity, then, by Proposition 2, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the pricing subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium. Similarly, if all firm
capacities in a neighborhood of K∗ , then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the
pricing subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium, so the first-stage profit function for Firm
i can be written as






X 





Πu (Ki ; K−i ) = Ptot 
K j  − c Ki ,




j
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(19)

where K−i is the capacity of the other firms.
Firm i’s capacity, Ki , maximizes Firm i’s profits only if Ki = K∗ is the solution to
∂Πu (Ki ; K∗ )
= Ptot ((n − 1)K∗ + Ki ) − c + P0tot ((n − 1)K∗ + Ki )Ki = 0,
∂Ki

(20)

which is concave and therefore has a unique solution, Ki (K∗ ). Clearly Ki (K∗ ) is decreasing
in K∗ , so (20) uniquely defines a symmetric solution K∗ , and it is easy to see that K∗ must
be exactly equal to the Cournot quantity associated with n firms, production cost c, and
demand Dtot (p). So we have shown that Ki = K∗ is a local best response. Next, we show
that Ki = K∗ is the global best response when rival firms choose K∗ .
Suppose that Ki < K∗ . If a uniform price equilibrium exists when Firm i chooses Ki and
other firms choose K∗ , then Firm i’s profits are given by (19), and so Firm i’s profits at Ki
are strictly lower than at K∗ .
If, on the other hand, a uniform-price equilibrium does not exist when Firm i chooses
Ki and other firms choose K∗ , then by Proposition 1 an asymmetric-price equilibrium must
exist. Under Assumption 4, Firm i cannot profit by deviating from the uniform-price
equilibrium even if its capacity is K∗ , so Firm i is not the low-priced firm in the first period.
The only asymmetric-price equilibrium that can exist is one in which one of Firm i’s rivals
is the firm that sells at the low price in the first period. There are n − 1 such equilibria
because any of the n − 1 firms with capacity K∗ could set the low price in the first period.
Firm i’s first-stage profit in all of these asymmetric-price equilibria is
h 

i
Πa (Ki ; K∗ ) = P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) − c Ki ,

(21)

where p1 is the price charged in the first period, and so p1 maximizes



D1 (p1 )p1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) K∗ − D1 (p1 ) .
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(22)

Firm i’s first order-condition is
P02



!



dp1
0
(n − 1)K + K − D1 (p1 ) 1 − D1 (p1 ) i + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) − c = 0.
dK
i

∗

(23)

Because p1 < p2 , D(p1 ) is greater than first-period sales at the uniform price. This implies
that n − 1 firms are each selling less than K∗ − D(p̃)/n in period 2, where p̃ is the uniform
price. In this case, ignoring the impact of Ki on p1 , Firm i’s best response is greater than
K∗ − D(p̃)/n, which implies that Ki > K∗ , which is a contradiction. And, as Ki increases, the
optimal first-period price falls (dp1 /dKi < 0). Thus, ignoring the impact of Ki on p1 does
not alter the result. Deviating to a lower Ki is still not profitable.
Now suppose that Ki > K∗ . Again, the equilibrum of the pricing subgame may be
an asymmetric-price equilibrium or a uniform-price equilibrium. If it is a uniform-price
equilibrium, then by the same argument, profits are strictly lower.
If it is an asymmetric-price equilibrium, then it must be an asymmetric-price equilibrium in which Firm i sets a low price in the first period. This is because an asymmetric-price
equilibrium exists only if a firm wants to deviate from the uniform-price equilibrium, and
(18) tells us that a firm wants to deviate only if η2 (p)/η1 (p) exceeds its share of capacity.
But by Assumption 4, this happens only if the capacity share exceeds 1/n and only Firm
i’s share of capacity exceeds 1/n.
So, if Firm i deviates to Ki > K∗ , then its profit must be


 

max D1 p1 p1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 p1 Ki − D1 p1 .
p1

Rewriting this as a function of quantity yields



max P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − q1 Ki − q1 .
q1
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(24)

Thus, the firm’s profit in stage one is



max P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − q1 Ki − q1 − cKi ,
q1

(25)

and its maximized profit in stage one is



max P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − q1 Ki − q1 − cKi ,
q1 ,K1

(26)

which we can rewrite using a change of variables (q2 = Ki − q1 ) as

max P1 (q1 )q1 − cq1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + q2 q2 − cq2 .
q1 ,q2

(27)

Therefore, q1 is the first-period monopoly output, and q2 is the second-period best response
to (n − 1)K∗ . But this is not a profitable deviation for firm i unless p1 < p2 (otherwise both
prices are lower than the uniform price), or equivalently the Lerner index in the first period
is smaller than the Lerner index in period 2, or

P02 (n − 1)K∗ + q2 q2

<
P1 (q1 )
P2 (n − 1)K∗ + q2

(28)

q2
1
1
<
|η1 (p1 )| |η2 (p2 )| (n − 1)K∗ + q2

(29)

η2 (p2 )
q2
<
,
η1 (p1 ) (n − 1)K∗ + q2

(30)

P01 (q1 )q1

or

which violates Assumption 4 because q2 < K∗ . So, this is a contradiction. Hence there
exists no profitable deviation for any firm. 
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Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 1, which shows that a pure strategy
equilibrium exists and that any pure strategy equilibrium must be a uniform-price equilibrium or an asymmetric price equilibrium in which the Stage 1 price is strictly lower
than the Stage 2 price. But if the elasticity of demand is increasing, an asymmetric price
equilibrium cannot exist. The firm selling in Stage 1 prefers to sell all of its capacity at the
market clearing price in Stage 2. 

Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. By Proposition 4 all transactions take place at the same price, and by Lemma 1 firms
set the Cournot capacities as if there were one combined sales period. 

Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. Let kti denote the inventory control for Firm i in period t. Let qiC
t denote the output
of firm i in period t when firms play a sequential Cournot game.
Consider an equilibrium of the inventory control game in which, on the equilibrium
path, firms choose capacity equal to the sum of the Cournot capacity in each period,
, set the Cournot price, pCt in each period, and then set inventory controls
Ki = qiC
+ qiC
2
1
equal to the Cournot output in each period, i.e., kti = qiC
t .
Clearly no deviation is profitable in the final period. That is, in every Stage 2 subgame
firms set the market clearing price and set a non-binding inventory control. This is because
Lemma 2 holds, so any second-period price not equal to the market-clearing price is less
profitable. Introducing inventory controls does not change this result.
Next, consider a deviation by Firm i to a lower price in the first selling period. Decreasing demand elasticity implies that pC1 < pC2 , so a small decrease in its first-period price
discontinuously increases Firm i’s first-period sales, decreases Firm i’s second-period sales,
and decreases Firm i’s profits. More generally, if Firm i had a profitable deviation to a
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lower price in period one, then that price would define an asymmetric price equilibrium,
but by Proposition 2 an asymmetric-price equilibrium does not exist. So deviating to a
lower price is not profitable.
Now consider a deviation by Firm i to a higher price in the first period. Under
the efficient rationing rule, the residual demand function facing the deviating firm is
RDi1 (pi ; p − i1 , q − i1 ) = D1 (p) − (n − 1)qC1 . This is because of the rival firms’ inventory
j

j

controls, k1 = qC1 (if any firm deviates in stage zero, then k1 equals the Cournot output
given the new capacity constraint).
Since the shadow cost of capacity is c on the equilibrium path (and, more generally, is
equalized across periods), Firm i’s first-period profit function is (D1 (pi )−(n−1)qC1 )(pi −c) or,
equivalently, (p1 ((n − 1)qC1 + qi ) − c)qi where p1 is the first period inverse demand function.
Thus, the optimal price deviation is given by the first-order condition, which is




P01 (n − 1)qC1 + q q + P1 (n − 1)qC1 + q = c.
But this implies that q = qC1 and that the optimal price and quantity is the first-period
Cournot output (or, more generally, is the output that equalizes the marginal revenue
across the two periods), so no deviation to a higher price is profitable.
Under the proportional rationing rule, the deviating firm’s residual demand function
is



C
(n
−
1)q
 1


1
 = D1 (pi ),
RDi1 (pi ; pC1 , qC1 ) = D1 (pi ) 1 −
 n
D1 (pC1 )

since D1 (pC1 ) = nqC1 . The shadow cost of capacity is c on the equilibrium path (and, more
generally, is equalized across the two periods), so Firm i’s first-period profit function is


1
0
n D1 (p)(p − c), or equivalently, p1 (nq) − cq. The first-order condition is P1 nq + P1 nq q = c,
which implies that q = qC1 , so no deviation to a higher price is profitable.
In Stage zero, firms choose capacity expecting to equalize marginal revenue across
periods, so Ki = qC1 + qC2 is a best response to K j = qC1 + qC2 for all j , i. 
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Cournot model with linear demand and with and without discrimination
We illustrate the impact of inventory controls on prices and profits in an example with
linear demand, Pt (qt ) = at − bt qt , and constant cost per unit of capacity, c. There are n firms.
Suppose that the firms could choose capacity independently for each stage (as if the two
stages were separate markets). Then, the Cournot profits with price discrimination are
given by
Πdiscr. =

(b2 (a1 − c)2 + b1 (a2 − c)2 )
,
(b1 b2 (n + 1)2 )

If firms sold at the aggregate Cournot outcome with uniform pricing, profits are

Πuniform =

(b2 (a1 − c) + b1 (a2 − c))

2 a1 +b1 a2

b

b1 +b2


−c

(b1 b2 (n + 1)2 )

.

Profits are clearly higher under discriminatory prices because
Πdiscr. − Πuniform

!
b2 a1 + b1 a2
∝ b2 (a1 − c) + b1 (a2 − c) − (b2 (a1 − c) + b1 (a2 − c))
−c
b1 + b2
1
(b2 (a1 − c)(b1 (a1 − a2 ) + b1 (a2 − c)b2 (a2 − a1 ))
=
b1 + b2
b1 b2
b b2
((a1 − c)(a1 − a2 ) + (a2 − c)(a2 − a1 )) = 1
=
(a1 − a2 )2 > 0.
b1 + b2
b1 + b2
2

2
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